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Abstract
The validity of the Hotelling￿s rule, the fundamental theorem of nonrenewable resource eco-
nomics, is limited by its partial equilibrium nature. One symptom of this limitation may be
the disagreement between the empirical evidence, showing stable or declining resource prices,
and the rule, predicting exponentially increasing prices. In this paper, we study the optimal
depletion of a nonrenewable resource in a dynamic general equilibrium framework. We show that
in, the long run, the price of a nonrenewable (i) is constant when the nonrenewable is essential
in production, and (ii) it increases only if the rate of return of capital is larger than the capital
depreciation rate and if the non-renewable is an inessential input in production. We believe that
our model oﬀers a theoretical explanation to non-growing nonrenewable prices and hence at least
partially solves the paradox between the Hotelling￿s rule and the empirical regularities. We also
show that two factors play a crucial role in determining the long run behavior of non-renewable
prices, namely the elasticity of substitution between input factors, and the long run behavior of
the real interest rate. Another major achievement of this study is the full analytical solution of
the model under a Cobb-Douglas technology.
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In his seminal article, Hotelling (1931) showed that the price for a nonrenewable resource will rise
at the real interest rate in an eﬃcient market equilibrium,1 a result known as the ￿Hotelling￿s rule￿
since then.2 Hotelling￿s rule has become the pillar of the theory of nonrenewable resource economics
and has provided the fundamental insight into the long-run behavior of the price and extraction of
a resource since then.3 In time, it has been documented that the Hotelling￿s rule is not supported
by empirical evidence. In particular, almost all empirical studies have shown that nonrenewable
resources have either declining or constant prices in the last 150 years (e.g., see Krautkraemer,
1998). The response to this paradox has been the modi￿cation of the basic Hotelling￿s formulation
by incorporating additional elements into the model (e.g., exploration costs, capital investment
and capacity constraints, ore quality variations, output substitution, or uncertainty), although
some authors tried alternative econometric techniques or data so as to generate rising resource
prices.
Surprisingly, no one ever questioned a probable shortage in Hotelling￿s approach, namely the
exogeneity of the discount rate. This paper approaches the paradox from this point of view and
shows that the paradox may indeed be ￿c t i t i o u si nt h es e n s et h a tt h et r u eH o t e l l i n g ￿ sr u l em a yn o t
suggest an ever-increasing nonrenewable resource price, at least not in all instances. Recall that
Hotelling￿s rule takes the interest rate as given if the resource sector is considered in isolation. Crit-
ical information is hence lost because the interaction between the marginal productivity of capital
and the nonrenewable resource is not taken into consideration. In a general equilibrium setting,
on the other hand, the level of extraction has a determining role on the marginal productivity of
capital and hence on the real rate of interest, where the latter in￿uences the resource price and the
level of extraction. Hence, in general equilibrium, the resource price and real interest rate are de-
termined simultaneously, in sharp contrast with the partial equilibrium approach. Let us illustrate
this endogenous determination of factor prices in case both inputs are essential4. The marginal
productivity of capital decreases if the percentage change in resource extraction is dominated by
the decline in percentage change in capital. It follows that the rental rate of capital decreases.
Consequently, the rate of increase in the price of the nonrenewable declines because, according to
the Hotelling￿s rule, the rate of increase of the resource price cannot deviate from the real interest
rate. Therefore, the endogenous interaction between factor prices and factor quantities may de￿ne
ad i ﬀerent time pattern for resource price than what partial equilibrium Hotelling￿s rule suggests.
We believe that this critical endogenous interaction is missing in the ￿partial equilibrium￿ version of
the Hotelling￿s rule. Hence, a contradiction may arise between empirics and theory. The paradox
vanishes if a ￿complete￿ solution, in the sense of an integrated nonrenewable resource sector and a
good sector, is studied.
The Hotelling￿s rule was incorporated into (neoclassical) growth theory a long time ago, espe-
1Hotelling (1931) assumes the real interest rate to be a constant.
2Note that Faustmann (1839) derived essentially the same result.
3A short review of the literature is as follows. Gray (1914) was the ￿rst who discussed the nonrenewable resource
problem from the ￿rm￿s viewpoint. Hotelling (1931) made the full analytical treatment. Her￿ndahl (1955) studied
Gray￿s work analytically. Gordon (1967) presented a concise review of the literature and discussed a case where
cumulative extraction increases costs. Smith (1968) presented a uni￿ed theory of production of natural resources.
Dasgupta and Heal (1974), Solow (1974), and Stiglitz (1974a, 1974b) investigated conditions for a sustainable con-
sumption in one-sector growth models constrained by nonrenewable resources. These papers show that technological
change and a high degree of substitutability between nonrenewables and reproducible capital are necessary conditions
for achieving a non-decreasing consumption. See surveys of Peterson and Fisher (1977) and Krautkraemer (1988) for
ag o o de x p o s u r et ot h er e s to ft h el i t e r a t u r e .
4We call a factor input essential if a positive amount of such input is necessary to produce a positive level of
output.3
cially in the issue of sustainable consumption. Several papers written in the 1970s hinted at the
two means of achieving sustainability when an economy is dependent on nonrenewable resource:
substitution for a reproducible factor and technological change (see Dasgupta and Heal (1974) and
Stiglitz (1974a)). Surprisingly enough, these studies ignored a distinguishing feature of growth
models with nonrenewable resources that we believe prevented them to expose the true general
equilibrium version of the Hotelling￿s rule. A peculiar characteristic of growth models with nonre-
newables is that resource price and rental rate of capital only depend on the ratio of capital and
resource extraction, and are determined independently from the rest of the model (i.e., consump-
tion, capital, and resource extraction).5 If the rental rate of capital and the rate of discount on
pro￿ts in the extraction sector are assumed identical, it leads to a diﬀerential equation in terms
of capital-resource extraction ratio that does not have any counter-force on the accumulation of
this ratio. The end result turns out to be a distortion of the solutions of rental rate of capital and
resource price. A good illustration is the basic Solow (1956) model. If depreciation is removed
from the fundamental equation of growth, capital and hence output would grow to in￿nite levels.
Dasgupta and Heal (1974) and Stiglitz (1974a) neglected this aspect in their models and this led
them to reproduce the partial equilibrium results of Hotelling￿s rule in a general equilibrium model.
However, Hotelling￿s rule is not reproduced if capital depreciates.
A summary of our model is as follows. There are two factors of production, namely a repro-
ducible capital and a nonrenewable resource, and one ￿nal output, which can be consumed or
invested. The two factors may be complements or substitutes in the production of the ￿nal good.
Pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms operating in the good market imply a unique resource price/rental ratio and
a corresponding optimal capital/resource ratio. A nonrenewable resource-extracting sector solves
the dynamic problem of maximizing discounted pro￿ts over an in￿nite horizon, constrained by the
initial stock of the nonrenewable. An exogenous savings rate assumption in the Solovian sense on
the allocation of factor income and market clearing conditions for capital and the nonrenewable
complete the model.
The organization of the paper is as follows. The second section presents the model under the
Cobb-Douglas technology assumption. We show that the paradox between the Hotelling￿s rule and
the empirical evidence may indeed be ￿ctitious and that the true Hotelling￿s rule may suggest a
constant nonrenewable resource price. The third section discusses the CES version of the model
and presents numerical simulation results. The last section presents concluding remarks.
2. The Model
We assume that physical capital K and a nonrenewable resource R are used to produce a ￿nal
good Y .T h e￿nal good production technology is represented by F (K,R). It is supposed that F (￿)
is increasing, strictly concave, twice diﬀerentiable, homogenous of degree one, and shows a constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) between K and R. The nonrenewable resource sector production
technology is based on extraction. For matter of simplicity, we assume that the intertemporal
consumption-investment trade-oﬀ is given to the model, as in Solow (1956). Our motivation behind
this assumption is twofold. First, we would like to fully focus on the ￿production￿ side of the
economy. Second, this assumption allows us to solve the model analytically, when the elasticity of
substitution equals one, without loosing substantial information on the time patterns of variables.
Indeed, we will show that in the long run (steady state) the constant savings rate assumption does
not play any role in the behavior of the nonrenewable resource price, which, at least partially,
legitimizes our simpli￿cation.
5This peculiar characteristic holds only if the marginal cost of extraction is constant.4
2.1. Production sector
The representative ￿rm producing output Y solves the problem:
max
Y =0
{Y − C(r,q,Y )} (1)
where r and q are the real rental rate of capital and the nonrenewable resource price, and C (r,q, Y )
is the optimized value (or cost function) of the cost minimization problem:
C ≡ min
K,R=0
{rK + qR|Y 5 F (K,R)} (2)
For analytical tractability we will exploit the Cobb-Douglas technology in the production of
output Y .I n Section 3 we will generalize the model by using a CES technology. It is easy to
show that if the technology is of the Cobb-Douglas type, say, Y = KαR1−α, then the cost function









where MC(r,q) is the marginal cost of producing a unit of output Y. The conditional factor
demands for K and R can be found by applying Shephard￿s Lemma to the cost function:
K = Cr (r,q,Y )=MCr (r,q)Y (4)
and
R = Cq (r,q,Y )=MCq (r,q)Y (5)
The constant returns to scale property of the technology implies that C (r, q,Y ) is linear in Y and
thus the pro￿t maximization problem (1) can be rewritten as
max
Y =0
{Y − MC(r,q)Y } (6)
Note that pro￿t maximization implies
MC(r,q)=1 (7)
or the well known zero pro￿t condition of perfect competition, where marginal cost equals output
price. In this economy, we assume that a fraction s of total output Y is used to accumulate the
capital stock of the economy in the form of investment
˙ K = sY − δK (8)5
where s is the exogenous saving rate, δ is the depreciation rate, and a dot over a variable denotes
its time derivative. We assume that the economy begins with an amount of physical capital K0.








Using (3) and (7) we can solve for r as follows
r =
ˆ



















K − δK (11)


















If we knew the path of q(t) then from (12) the path of K (t) would also be known. To solve for
the path of q(t) we now look at the nonrenewable extracting sector￿s problem.
2.2. Extraction sector
Hotelling (1931) determined the optimal extraction of nonrenewable resources in a perfectly
competitive market economy in a partial equilibrium setup. We exploit his setup in order to
determine the dynamics de￿ned by the resource sector. Suppose that extraction is costless. The














A c c o r d i n gt oe q u a t i o n(13), the representative ￿rm in the resource sector maximizes discounted
pro￿ts over an in￿nite horizon subject to the physical resource constraint that total extraction can
be utmost the initial stock S0. In (13), r(t) − δ is the real interest rate. In contrast to the partial
equilibrium Hotelling￿s approach the real interest rate is endogenously determined in our model.




0(r(τ)−δ)dτ − λR(t) (14)6
where λ is Lagrange multiplier and constant (see Chiang, 1992, p.139-143 for a proof of argu-















= r(t) − δ (17)
Equation (17) is a non-arbitrage condition saying that the nonrenewable is essentially an asset
and therefore its (real) price must grow at the real interest rate.































































That is, q is constant in the long run. Note that equation (19) depends on q(0) which has to be
determined from the model. To ￿nd the value of q(0), we use the constraint
Z ∞
0
R(t) 5 S0 (21)




























We can integrate (23) to solve for q(0) if (21) holds with equality. We claim that if an equilibrium
exists then (21) must hold with equality. Note that equation (15) indicates that λ = q(0). For an
equilibrium to exist it must be the case that q(0) is positive. Otherwise, sector Y would demand
an in￿nite amount of R, which is unfeasible since R is bounded by S0. Thus, the existence of
equilibrium requires q(0)(= λ) to be positive and therefore the constraint (21) holds with equality.
This allows us to use (21) to solve for q(0). Substituting (23) into (21) and solving for q(0) we









We impose the condition that the share of capital is greater than the savings rate (α>s ) in
order to assure a positive initial resource price. Indeed, this condition is also required by the
transversality condition de￿ned by (16).T o s e et h i s ,￿rst note that q = λe
R t
0 i(τ)dτ from equation







0 i(τ)dτ = λ lim
t→∞
R(t)=0 (25)




which can be trivially shown under the assumption that α>s(cf., equation (30) below).
It should be noted that the long run value of q is only in￿uenced by technological parameters
and the depreciation rate of capital δ, though the exogenous savings rate s has some eﬀect on its
value transitionally. In other words, the long run value (steady state) of q is free of the constant
savings rate assumption, that at least partially alleviates the exogenous saving rate assumption in
























Thus q(t) approaches qss from below (above) if
K0
S0






(α − s) (28)8
and converges asymptotically to a constant. This ￿nding is important for two reasons. Firstly, we
show that non-renewable price does not necessarily increase in the long-run, even in such a case that
it is an essential input in production. Secondly, transitionally, the resource price may increase or








(α − s), the resource price will increase at decreasing rates and converge to its
steady-state value from below. Hence, resource prices may transitionally show diverging behaviors
in diﬀerent economies and/or for diﬀerent nonrenewable resource stocks. This may help explain
why diﬀerent nonrenewable resources may have diﬀerent price behaviors in the short run.





























Equation (20) and (17) imply that r does not grow in the long run and equals the depreciation rate






















Thus asymptotically R(t) shows the same properties as K. The single most important ￿nding of
t h em o d e li st h a tt h er e s o u r c ep r i c eq is constant in the long run. Our explanation is that resource
depletion has immediate impacts on factor prices that are fed back to capital accumulation and
resource extraction. In the C-D case, though capital stock starts to decline after a while, the
decrease in resource extraction lowers marginal productivity of capital and hence the real interest
rate. The decrease in the interest rate means a lower rate of growth in the resource price that further
lowers extraction level. The ￿vicious￿ cycle generates an optimal (contraction) path for all variables.
This ￿nding is a counter-example to the partial equilibrium Hotelling￿s rule suggesting that resource
prices are not necessarily growing. It also contradicts with previous general equilibrium studies,
e.g., Dasgupta and Heal (1974). Below, we compare and contrast our results (GTY) with that


















































The basic diﬀerence between our model and Dasgupta and Heal￿s model can be observed from
Table 1. Firstly, recall that q and r in a growth model with a nonrenewable are solely function
of K/R and that they are independent from the rest of the model. In Dasgupta and Heal, the
ratio K/R approaches in￿nity (which is a ￿forced￿ result); therefore, they conclude that q and r
approach in￿nity and zero, respectively. In our model, K/R approaches a constant and hence q
and r also approach a constant. We believe that it is against the notion of optimality to ￿nd that
a contracting economy can oﬀer higher and higher prices to a nonrenewable while less and less of
everything is used.
2.3. Monopoly
An alternative market structure assumption in the resource market is monopoly. In our model,
a monopolist who owns all deposits takes into account the relationship between q and R,s ot h a t
the necessary condition in (15) becomes marginal revenue equal to marginal user cost. Hence,
marginal revenue (and not price) will rise at the rate of interest (in case of zero extraction costs).
But this in itself does not tell us whether the resource will be extracted more or less rapidly than
by competitive producers. Some, following Hotelling (1931, p.153), might assume that the rate
of resource extraction is reduced because of ￿the general tendency for production to be retarded
under monopoly￿. However, as Weinstein and Zeckhauser (1975), Sweeney (1977), Stiglitz (1976),
and Kay and Mirrlees (1975) discussed and showed, the deviation in the extraction behavior of
monopolist with respect to the perfectly competitive case depends on the price elasticity of demand.
In particular, under the constant elasticity demand schedules, with zero extraction costs, monopoly
prices and competitive equilibrium prices will in fact be identical, and hence the rate of utilization
of the natural resource. Since our analytical model exploits a Cobb-Douglas technology, it implies
a constant elasticity demand and therefore monopoly and perfectly competitive cases are identical.
Unfortunately, algebra becomes unnecessarily complicated for the CES case. Therefore, we ignore
these analysis in this paper.
3. The CES technology
We now assume that the technology for producing output Y is given by
Y =( αKρ +(1− α)Rρ)
1
ρ (31)
where ρ (−∞,1],αis the distribution parameter, and σ = 1
1−ρ is the elasticity of substitution















Since the envelope properties of the cost function still hold we have that
















































Substituting this expression into (8) we obtain







K − δK (36)



































K − δK (38)






































Analogous to the Cobb-Douglas case, if we knew how q evolves over time then the path of K
would be fully determined. We now turn into the extracting sector￿s problem to ￿nd the path of






















This expression however does not have an analytical solution. Therefore, we solve the model
numerically and ￿nd the transition path of all the variables of the model under diﬀerent elasticity
assumptions. Before this let us look at the stability and long run properties of the model in the
CES case.
3.1. Long run equilibria and stability properties
In this subsection, we present the long-run stability properties and long run equilibria of the
CES case. Note that all the variables of the model could be found if the path of q(t) were known.
Thus, it is suﬃcient to look at the stability properties of equation (40). To this end, we compute
the derivative of (40) and examine it under each of the possible long-run behaviors of q:
Case 1
˙ q
q =0in the long run =⇒ q is constant in the long run
Case 2
˙ q





q > 0 in the long run =⇒ lim
t→∞
q(t)=∞





Denote as   the derivative
d˙ q



























q =0 , then (17) implies that r = δ. Using (37) to solve for q and setting r = δ, we have that
























< 0 to verify whether Case 1 and (42) represent a stable long














Note that  q∗




1−ρ or α<δ ρ.T h a ti s ,i fα<δ ρ then a long
run equilibrium for which
˙ q
q =0represents a stable equilibrium. Note that the Cobb-Douglas case
presented in the previous subsection refers to the case where ρ =0 . Since α<1 then Case 1 applies




We can easily rule out case 2 as a long run equilibrium solution. Note that if
˙ q
q < 0 then we must
have that lim
t→∞

























1−ρ. The other alternatives
for q to approach in￿nity such as r →∞or r → 0 can be easily ruled out (see Appendix B). Note
that since r approaches α
1
ρ as time goes to in￿nite, then it is also the case that
˙ q
q approaches the
constant r − δ = α
1
ρ − δ. To study if
˙ q





























e q =0in the long run, that is e q is constant. Substituting for
˙ q
















































































for this to hold we must have that both α
1
ρ − δ>0 (note that for
˙ q
q > 0 to hold it must be that
α
1
ρ −δ>0)a n dρ>0. That is, for q to represent a ￿stable￿ equilibrium when it approaches in￿nite
it must be that α
1
ρ − δ>0 and ρ>0.










































ρ − δ>0 (54)
lim
t→∞












F o ra ne c o n o m yt oa ﬀord higher values of q at the steady state (as case (ii) indicates) it must
be that the marginal physical product of capital r = α
1
ρ (>δ ) is large enough as to compensate for14
the lost of capital due to depreciation. In such case capital accumulates and the economy displays
positive growth. Note that only when ρ>0, output can be positive even though R may be zero,
(Y (K,0) > 0). In other words, capital and the nonrenewable resource must be substitutes in pro-
duction, if positive output has to be assured. Hence, a precondition for the prices of nonrenewables
to approach in￿nite (q →∞ ) is the ability of the economy to accumulate capital and the degree of
substitution between K and R.
At this point, we would like to pinpoint another contributing aspect of our study. Contrary to
what Dasgupta and Heal (1974) propose, here we ￿nd that the long run behavior of q does not only
depend on whether inputs are substitutes or not in production. In addition to this, the long run
behavior of q also depends on the size of the rate of depreciation and the CES share parameter α.
In Dasgupta and Heal (1974), σ>1 always leads the economy to in￿nitely value the nonrenewable
in the long-run. We above showed that for low levels of substitution (i.e., ρ values approach to zero






holds and the result
˙ q
q =0realizes. Figure 1 below depicts
the threshold level.
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holds, the long run marginal productivity of capital becomes insuﬃcient to
compensate for the loss in capital depreciation and hence results diverge from the ￿general solution￿,
where resource price grows to in￿nite values. This result also shows that the rate of depreciation
plays an important role in the behavior of the nonrenewable resource price.
3.2. Simulations
The simulations of the CES case reveal valuable information on the time path of the model￿s
variables under varying elasticity of substitution assumptions. Below, we present the time paths
of the rental rate of capital r, resource price q,c a p i t a lK, and extraction rate R.W ea s s u m et h e
following parameter values: s =0 .2, δ =0 .04, α =0 .7, K0 =5 0 , S0 =2 5 ,a n dρ = 1
3 (⇒ σ =1 .5),
or ρ =0(⇒ σ =1 ), or ρ = −1
9 (⇒ σ = .9). Note that when ρ = 1
3 (⇒ σ =1 .5)w eh a v et h a t
the conditions of stability for Case 3 hold (α
1
ρ − δ =0 .545 > 0 and ρ = 1
3 > 0) and therefore the
price of the nonrenewable grows to in￿nity (see Figure 2.b). When ρ =0(⇒ σ =1 ), and ρ = −1
9
(⇒ σ =0 .9) the stability condition of Case 1 holds which refers to the case when q converges to
a constant.
The rental rate of capital shows a similar behavior in the three cases in the sense that it always
converges to a constant (see Figure 2.a). Nonetheless, r converges to diﬀerent levels, depending on
the elasticity of substitution assumption. In particular, when ρ = 1
3 (⇒ σ =1 .5), r converges to
r = α
1
ρ,g i v e nt h a tα
1
ρ −δ>0 holds. When ρ =0(⇒ σ =1 )o rρ = −1
9 (⇒ σ = .9)w eo b s e r v et h a t15
r tends to δ. In the former case, the level of r is large enough to compensate for the loss of capital
due to depreciation, and hence, capital accumulates and tends to in￿nity as Figure 2.c displays.
Otherwise, capital stock tends to zero level after showing some increase initially. The behavior of
resource price is substantially aﬀected by the rental rate of capital. When that rate converges to
δ, the net return for capital assets become zero, and hence the price of nonrenewable converges
to a constant. Otherwise, its price explodes (see Figure 2.b). The extraction R path of the non-
renewable resource tends to zero for any elasticity of substitution assumption; nonetheless, larger
levels of extraction are observed in the short run when the resource is a substitute in production.
This is optimal as the economy calculates that it may initially exploit resource stocks for accelerating
capital accumulation, which can be later used to substitute for the resource as it depletes (see Figure
2.d).
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Figure 2.d The time path of R(t)
4. Conclusion
In this paper, inspired by Dasgupta and Heal (1974), we have studied the growth behavior
of an economy in the presence of a nonrenewable resource. Like Dasgupta and Heal (1974), we
integrated a nonrenewable resource sector with an output sector. In contrast to them, we focused
on market solution, as it reveals clearer information on the behavior of variables and on Hotelling￿s
rule. The basic diﬀerence between our model and Dasgupta and Heal￿s model, however, is that we
diﬀerentiate between the rental rate of capital and interest rate, which is used to discount pro￿ts
in the resource sector. This single diﬀerence substantially changes the transitional and long-run
behavior of the rental rate of capital r and the non-renewable resource price q. T h i si sb e c a u s e
the eﬃciency rule for resource extraction can be expressed as a diﬀerential equation in terms of
capital-resource extraction ratio, which grows in￿nitely if there is no countervailing factor. We
￿rst show analytically that, with a Cobb-Douglas technology, the nonrenewable resource price
converges to a constant. Next, we extend our analysis to CES technology using simulations, and
show that a similar behavior of resource price is observed if the nonrenewable is a complement.
Our simulation analysis also reveals that the elasticity of substitution assumption heavily aﬀects
the path of depletion and capital accumulation. We show that for levels of elasticity of substitution
close to one from the right the model reproduces results similar to those cases when R is an essential
input in production. We conclude that the economy would shrink if elasticity of substitution is not
suﬃciently greater than one.
Our analysis shows that the dynamic general equilibrium version of Hotelling￿s rule does not
imply an in￿nitely growing resource price. This solves, at least partially, the paradox between
the Hotelling￿s rule and the empirical evidence that resource prices are constant in the long-run.
However, our results are not complete due to at least two reasons, which brings us to suggest two
research questions.
First, our analysis needs to be extended into Ramsey setup, where the saving/consumption
allocation is endogenously made. We believe that the (long-run) results would not change qualita-
tively. Nevertheless, an endogenous saving/consumption allocation brings into stage an important
additional factor in depleting-resource analysis: the consumer￿s patience. When it is known that a
nonrenewable resource is being depleted, discounting the future plays a crucial role in consumption-
investment decisions. In that respect, the impact of the consumer￿s patience on the optimal deple-
tion of resources must be signi￿cant and deserves investigation.
Secondly, we ignored technological improvements in our analysis. However, technological change
is the second alternative way of mitigating resource needs and may reduce the demand for non-
renewable resources. Hence, the optimal behavior of resource price depends on technology and17
technological change. This is the second area that we suggest for future work.18
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Since this limit must exist we impose that s<α .












































































































Firstly, if r →∞and ρ>0 we have that (44) becomes
lim
r−→∞,ρ>0






















that is q would be a constant in the long run contradicting that
˙ q
q > 0. Now if r →∞and ρ<0













































This also implies that q is constant in the long run (even perhaps a complex number) contradicting
˙ q
q > 0. Secondly, if r → 0,t h e n
˙ q
q = −δ which contradicts
˙ q
q > 0. Thus the only admissible way for
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